

Police or Military Police

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Subject Area - Genreal

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** Police or Military Police

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**Thesis:** Military police can no longer focus on performing law enforcement duties to the neglect of the battlefield mission of combat support. Marines must be relevant and support the mission of winning the nation's battles. The Marine Corps does not need only police in their inventory; they need military policeman providing combat support to the warfighter.

**Discussion:** Since the conception of the Military Occupational Specialty, 5800 Military Police, the focus of effort has been on performing law enforcement duties at Marine Corps bases and installations. Sending the FMF military police to perform strictly law enforcement duties on military bases has stripped the capabilities of the FMF military police to perform their battlefield missions. The Marine Corps must restructure the 5800 career field to integrate the capabilities of military police into the battlespace functions of the MAGTF. Military police personnel must return to the FMF forces and integrate into all training and exercises to develop their skills and enhance the capabilities available to the commander conducting military operations.

**Conclusion:** The force structure of the military police field can change without increases in personnel or line numbers. A critical look at the missions and functions performed by law enforcement units within the field will increase manpower available for the MEF. Creating a planning cell for the MEF Provost Marshal will integrate the core missions of the military police with a unity of effort focused on supporting the battle and enhancing force protection.

## INTRODUCTION

### **The Problem.**

The world has drastically and irrevocably changed since the end of the Cold War. The forces that the United States employs to meet future threats to our nation must be well trained, proficient, flexible, intelligent, and capable of acting on the commander's intent independently. Most importantly, the United States must employ tailored forces to meet the needs of the commander and the environment in which they operate in.

Marine Corps Military Police (MP) provide a viable tool for commanders to use to meet many of the challenges that the military will face in the future. The MP doctrinal missions, skills, and capabilities provide a trained force that is perfectly suitable for operations in low intensity small scale contingencies. The MP assets can not support the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in its doctrinal missions the way they are currently organized and structured. Dwindling personnel and resources in the Marine Corps will require leaders to support a structural change in the organization and employment of MP; it will require action.

If the MP are to be a viable, combat support force for the Marine Expeditionary Force Commander, the Marine Corps must affect a paradigm shift in employment, leadership, organization and structure. The tools and skills of a well-trained MP Company

provide a commander with a tremendous force multiplier, but only if units train and restructure to meet the commanders needs on the battlefield of the future.

The Marine Corps must restructure the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) MP and decide which role to emphasize, a combat support role or an enhanced law enforcement role at Marine Corps bases within in the United States. MP can provide a combat support role that significantly enhances and supports the warfighter while performing a variety of essential tasks on the battlefield. Currently, this capability is hampered by the over-emphasis on law enforcement within and outside the Military Police occupational specialty. MP can be a positive factor on the battlefield and the force of choice for employment in small scale contingencies, primarily peacekeeping and humanitarian operation roles. To do this, more emphasis and focus on the combat support role is essential.

If properly structured and employed, MP can meet many of the capabilities required while fighting in the battlespace of the 21st century. Their training in physical security, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism provides experienced personnel that will enhance the force protection posture of a command. MP combat support significantly increases the capabilities available to a commander.

If the future battlespace will be in the littorals, what better organization than the MP is there to conduct peacekeeping,

humanitarian, disaster, and civic assistance operations? Their extensive training in law enforcement in built up areas, their tactical training, disaster relief training, antiterrorist training, counterterrorist training, and force protection training make them an ideal unit for employment in these specific operations. In a low intensity environment or as a follow-on force, the MP bring the combat tools necessary to accomplish missions that a combat fighting unit should not have to perform.

A MP unit is not the force to deploy forward in situations where armed hostilities occur or where the expectation of armed hostilities with enemy troops is high. In high intensity conflicts the ground combat element is the force of choice. MP should operate in a combat support role or in the rear area to allow the commander to focus his combat power on the threat. The MP provide rear area security, security to the main supply routes, and assist in protecting high value targets.

## **BACKGROUND**

### **History**

The history of armed conflicts show that MP demonstrated their capability to support commanders in past conflicts. In past conflicts, MP employed to secure lines of communication, provide security for supply convoys, and maintain discipline within the armed forces. Throughout modern history, MP units,

performing their battlefield missions, have assisted commanders in accomplishing their operations. Napoleon Bonaparte stated, "You cannot have a good army without a police force within."<sup>1</sup> In 1945, Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery stated, "The Battle of Normandy and subsequent battles would never have been won but for the work and co-operation of Provost on the traffic routes."<sup>2</sup> General der Flieger Speidel said, "The Feldjager [MP] have fulfilled their psychological purpose. Their actions have rapidly gained them a reputation ... their help and support were much sought after."<sup>3</sup>

In the United States, MP units trace their lineage back to the Revolutionary War when the Continental Congress authorized a troop of police for George Washington on 27 May 1778. The responsibilities of this unit were essentially the same as the MP unit of today. "...[MP] were expected to patrol the camp ... During combat the unit was to patrol behind the Army's so-called second line where it also assumed what in later times would be called the "early warning" responsibility..."<sup>4</sup> In every major contingency MP units were formed to provide support to the commanders.

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<sup>1</sup>Williamson, Gordon and Ron Volstad. *German Military Police Units 1939-45*. London, Great Britain: Osprey 1989, 10.

<sup>2</sup>*German Military Police Units 1939-45*, 10.

<sup>3</sup>*German Military Police Units 1939-45*, 10.

<sup>4</sup>Robert K. Wright, Jr., "Military Police." Washington , DC:GPO, 1991, 91-22813, 3.

The Marine Corps can trace its MP lineage back to World War I when a contingent of MP formed to provide battlefield circulation and law and order for the Marines sent to France. In 1944, the Marine Corps formed the 1st Provisional MP Battalion, which served on Okinawa performing refugee and traffic control to ensure the supply routes remained open for throughput of ammunition and equipment. Redesignated the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, it served in China until they disbanded in 1946. In Korea, military police companies performed area security, enemy prisoner of war operations, refugee control, and battlefield circulation operations. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and 3rd Military Police Battalion performed area base defense, black market, bridge security, and enemy prisoners of war operations in Vietnam.<sup>5</sup>

Following Vietnam, significant changes occurred within the MP field within the Marine Corps. In the late 1960's, personnel who made up MP units lacked appropriate training and proficiency to performing MP duties effectively. A Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) did not exist for the MP MOS. Personnel assigned to perform MP duties were from a variety of occupational specialties and served as MP in jails and as base guard sentries.

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<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, *Employment of Military Police in Combat*, Washington DC: GPO, 11 February 1992. FMFM 3-5, 1-1.



At the end of Vietnam, the 1st and 3rd Military Police Battalions deactivated and military police companies formed in the Marine divisions (MARDIV) and Force Service Support Group (FSSG) of the Marine Corps. Camp Guards turned into Base Military Police Units and the MP ranks expanded with personnel who laterally moved from every MOS in the Marine Corps.

The most significant change occurred as a result of the news media. In 1969, the media attention, from Life Magazine's article and Mike Wallace's television story on treatment of prisoners at the Camp Pendleton Brig, contributed to a Congressional Blue Ribbon Investigation on the abuse of prisoners by the Marines. The investigation led to the formation of the 5800, Military Police Occupational Field. Another event that influenced the MP field was the developing drug culture and the civil rights movement of the early 1970s. This led to the Marine Corps leadership putting more emphasis on law enforcement. Crime, racial problems, and drug problems focused the MP leadership on performing the law enforcement mission and away from the focus of supporting the warfighter. Increased law enforcement requirements for criminal investigations, physical security enhancements, crime prevention, and increased security patrols created the need to pull MP from the MARDIV and FSSG to assist the Bases and Stations in performing the law enforcement mission.

The cost of the increase law enforcement mission was in the diminished support of MP to the warfighter. The Marine Corps MP, their own worst enemy, did not embrace the Army's concept of MP acting as combat multipliers for the infantry, 'A Force of Choice.' The Army's focus of effort for the MP Corps on combat support in the late 1970s and early 1980s significantly changed the future role of MP in the Army. They focused the Fort McClellan, Alabama military police school's efforts on their combat missions and de-emphasized the law enforcement. The Army continued to perform law enforcement duties because it was a doctrinal war time mission; however, their focus was on support to the combat mission. The most significant aspect within the Army MP leadership was the focused effort to educate the infantry commanders and Army leadership on the effectiveness of MP and their contribution to the warfighter's mission. Today MP in the Army, with four brigades comprised of seventeen MP battalions, deploy more than any other Army unit and perform a wide variety of missions associated with combat support.

The Marine Corps' MP field chose to focus on the law enforcement mission. They shifted from tactical training at the Army school, Fort McClellan, to focusing on installation law enforcement at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. This lack of insight, not to emphasize combat support to the warfighter, put the Marine Corps' MP field at a distinct disadvantage in the contribution it could make to the Fleet Marine Force.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the MP role and focus began to swing ever so slowly to combat support. Airfield security of high value targets was the stimulus. The Marine Corps Air Wing (MAW) gave up personnel line numbers to establish MP within the Marine Wing Support Squadrons to perform air base defense. This was a step in the right direction for changing the focus of effort to combat support. Recently, the Corps assigned a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Provost Marshal (PM) to all three MEFs enhancing that focus even more. In the early 1990s the MP leadership, using the Provost Marshal's annual meeting, began to focus their efforts on changing the field toward combat support. The success of this effort will be proportional to the success of restructuring the MP FMF unit's force structure and the de-emphasis on MP performing law enforcement duties at CONUS installations.

#### **Current Situation.**

The right military force mix must be available to meet the threats of the 21st Century. The MP can provide a flexible force to meet these threats. Without a major military power to threaten our nation, the near future environment will see the armed forces involved with small scale contingencies involving state and non-state actors, humanitarian efforts, and peacekeeping operations. Involvement will run from moderate to low intensity conflicts of short duration through peacekeeping

operations and humanitarian assistance. Highly trained and flexible military forces capable of performing a wide variety of missions provide commanders with a tool box of options for these type operations. The MP can provide this capability.

The four primary missions of the MP, rear area security, battlefield circulation, enemy prisoner of war operations, and law enforcement have provided and continue to provide a flexible force well suited for the future battlefield. Operations like URGENT FURY in Granada, RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti, and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia will continue to involve the United States' military forces in the future. In these operations, MP provided a flexible and mobile force in support of the war fighter.

Involvement in large scale contingencies, such as OPERATION DESERT STORM, may be less probable in the future, but combat forces must prepare to meet this contingency in the future. The MP provide useful capabilities that support the warfighter in this environment.

Ground combat forces need to train for high intensity conflict, whether small or large. Their focus of training should be on the integration of combined arms to violently attack the enemy and win our nation's battles. Their training focus should not encompass the core competencies of the MP. Training, which takes the focus away from this primary competency, negatively effects the divisions fighting ability. The strain of training infantry to meet skills inherent in MP will affect the unit's

capability to meet all their training objectives in an already full training cycle. In an article on training, Captain McCarthy, Commanding Officer,, I Battery, 3rdBN 10thMAR, wrote;

*Unfortunately, the combination of the current high tempo of operations--due to both scheduled and nonscheduled deployments--and frequent personnel changes, makes it extremely difficult for many units to meet all of their mission-oriented training requirements.*<sup>6</sup>

It is impossible to train ground forces effectively to meet the entire spectrum of threats, from humanitarian assistance to large scale contingencies, in the high operation tempo of the Corps. To attempt this will negatively reduce combat effectiveness and the morale of the ground forces; especially, a force whose core competency provides a capability to conduct operation in a low intensity conflict effectively. General Bandholtz, United States Army, identified the shortfall in having combat troops perform a MP mission after World War I. He cited inadequacies in assigning combat arms personnel to such technically demanding MP duties and stressed the obvious point that a permanent MP corps would ensure the existence of stable and efficient MP units in future emergencies.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Capt Michael A. McCarthy, USMC. "Training--Too Much of a Good Thing." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1997, 47-48.

<sup>7</sup>Robert K. Wright, Jr. "Military Police." Washington , DC:GPO, 1991, 91-22813, 9.

## **ASSUMPTIONS**

The future battlefield will see more asymmetrical enemies and non-state actors involved in conflicts and destabilization efforts. This type of conflict will be more similar to criminal gang activities than large armies conducting operations. The tactics involved in suppressing their actions may be better suited for a MP unit than a combat unit. The actions and tactics used by a MP fireteam to suppress criminal activity will be different than that of a combat arms fireteam in handling the same situations. The mentality and training are different. MP train with an escalation of force mentality and operate from restrictive rules of engagement at all times. Combat forces train to use overwhelming force to close with and destroy the enemy requiring an aggressive mentality. Over reaction can create an incident with international implications. This is more likely to occur using combat units who have the warrior mentality than with the MP, especially operating with restrictive rules of engagement.

In low intensity conflicts, the focus will not only be on the bad actor, but it will also focus on humanitarian needs, working with the country's law enforcement agencies, and working with civic assistance organizations, local and non-government organizations. Most of these conflicts will occur in third world countries. In this environment, the MP may be the right force and a more politically acceptable force that does not conjure up

images of combat forces occupying the country by the local inhabitants. The image projected by the type of forces deployed can affect the population's acceptance and the reaction by the media, who's negative portrayal of United States' forces could undermine the success of the mission.

### **Current Doctrine**


Currently, The MEF does not have MP units organic above subordinate commands. MP assets are currently divided between the MARDIV, FSSG, and the MAW and employ separately at the direction of the major subordinate commander's discretion. MP units are mutually supporting, but do not work with the synergistic effect that they would if they were under the direction of the MEF Provost Marshal. As a special staff officer, the MEF Provost Marshal has little input into the employment of the subordinate commands MP assets. The sum of parts does not equal the sum of the a cohesive whole. If the role of the MP is to support the MEF as a warfighter in the single battle concept, the current force structure is inadequate.

The current force structures of FMF MP units<sup>8</sup> are:

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<sup>8</sup>All organizational charts are taken from FMFM 3-5.

## Division, Headquarters Battalion, Military Police Company



4 OFF 60 ENL


MOBILITY ARMAMENT

8 M1038 3 M2

6 M145 3 M19

8 M998 2 240G

## Force Service Support Group, Military Police Company



5 OFF 143 ENL

MOBILITY ARMAMENT

20 M1038 6 M2


4 M145 6 M19

4 M998 6 240G

6 SAW



## Headquarters Marine Air Wing



MOBILITY	ARMAMENT
20 M1038	6 M2
4 M145	6 M19
4 M998	6 240G
	6 SAW

The current structure will not permit the MP to support the warrior on the next battlefield efficiently.

The ability to orchestrate the entire MP operation in a conflict is essential to meeting the higher commander's requirements. The battlefield circulation control mission includes route reconnaissance; surveillance and control of the main supply routes; straggler and refuge control; and intelligence collecting and reporting. It supports the continuous throughput of logistics and troop movement to the forward edge of the battle area over secure and trafficable

routes. If the future battlefield is in the littorals, the MP mission will be critical to the sustainment of operations for the commander.

Large refugee, pedestrian and vehicle traffic will congest the main supply routes slowing logistic support and movement. Key intersections and terrain features will become critical targets for the enemy's interdiction efforts in the area of operations. Trafficability of routes will be a daily mission in many third world countries because of poor road construction, weather, and inability to perform infrastructure repairs by local workers or military engineers. In the era of 'just in time' logistics on the future battlefield, protection of logistic throughput operations can have a major impact on combat operations. All the parts working together to support the main effort is essential.

Area Security in future deployments will receive more emphasis and focus to secure critical sites and personnel. Protection from criminals, terrorists, insurgents, and radical religious fundamentalists will increase the requirement for an integrated force protection plan of all critical assets within the theater of operations. MP units divided between major subordinate commands will not have the synergistic effect nor the capability to conduct their mission essential tasks on the battlefield.

If organized effectively, MP are a highly mobile force that provides significant capabilities toward supporting the rear area. "They are a response force to enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the rear area. Their mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol road networks and key terrain featured throughout the rear area."<sup>9</sup> A significant threat to United States' forces will be the criminal elements comprised of poor indigenous locals and organized gangs. These criminal elements will threaten sustainment operations by stealing what is available to them for profit or for survival. During Operation MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY in Haiti, the most significant threat to United States' forces was from the criminal element.

Force Protection requirements to protect personnel and critical assets from destruction by terrorists or insurgents and to prevent incidents such as Kobar Towers and the Marine barracks in Beirut will be a growing concern of all commanders who operate in third world countries. Integration of a Physical Security Plan, counterterrorist plan, and a barrier plan, for critical assets into a comprehensive Force Protection Plan is essential to mission success. If a barrier plan must be covered by observation, the integrated Force Protection Plan must also be cover by observation and supervision to make it effective. The

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<sup>9</sup>Department of Defense, Department of the Army, *Military Police Support for the Airland Battle*, Washington DC: GPO, May 1988. FM 19-1, 3-5

MP provide skilled assets to coordinate this effort for the commander.

MP conduct enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations, as prescribed in FMFRP 4-26, to relieve the combat commander from using his ground combat forces to conduct these missions. The Provost Marshal will coordinate all EPW operations into a consolidated plan for the MAGTF. The integration of EPW operations for security, temporary holding facilities, and transportation assets into the operation plan by the MEF Provost Marshal is essential.

Law enforcement support to the warfighter helps to maintain good order and discipline, preserve combat efficiency, and protect critical assets, as prescribed in FMFRP 4-25.

Doctrinally, MP cannot support all four core missions at the same time. The integration of operations, METT-T, intelligence report of the threat, and the higher commander's priority of effort will dictate the focus of effort for the MP. The coordinated effort required to meet the intent of the single battle commander cannot accomplish the requirements for MP supportability without a change in structure.

## **CURRENT EMPLOYMENT**

### **Law Enforcement**

MP spend minimal time on law enforcement duties on the battlefield. Commanders handle the majority of minor infractions

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice without resorting to MP assistance. MP investigate minor criminal incidents, but criminal investigators conduct the bulk of investigations on the battlefield. The FSSG Military Police Company contains one criminal investigation's officer and seven investigators, the wing contains five criminal investigators, and the Division Military Police Company contains one criminal investigation's officer and six investigators to conduct investigations within the MAGTF Area of Operations.

If the United States is not involved in a major conflict, Marine Corps Investigators are assigned to base law enforcement duties and, until recently, have rarely deployed. Experience in DESERT STORM demonstrated that investigators were ill prepared to conduct investigations in a combat environment. Their investigation skills were not deficient; they honed their skills at every Marine Corps base and installation in support of the peacetime mission.<sup>10</sup> The problems encountered by the investigators were a direct reflection of their lack of training in support of their combat mission. Lack of communications (both laterally and vertically), limited investigative tools and material, and limited mobility hindered the investigator's ability to perform. A criminal investigator now deploys with the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in support of the MAGTF

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<sup>10</sup>Retention of trained and skilled investigators within the Corps is difficult. Many choose to leave the Corps for jobs with civilian agencies.

Commander. The military police branch is making great strides to establish minimum requirements and standard equipment list for deploying investigators.

Many of the police<sup>11</sup> skills associated with base law enforcement duties provide skills necessary to perform this function while deployed. Law enforcement is only a small part of the primary missions required to perform on the battlefield by MP.

Since the creation of the Military Police Occupational Field at the end of the Vietnam War, MP have done a superb job developing skills to be policemen, i.e. law enforcement. Security of Marine Corps installations have been the top priority. To meet the ever increasing requirements associated with law enforcement, combat support MP personnel have been shifted from their units to serve strictly in the capacity of base law enforcement. The number of personnel assigned to each base MP unit is based on population, size of the installation, number of static posts, and location of the base. Without augmentation from FMF MP, Provost Marshals cannot meet the administrative requirements associated with running a police force.

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<sup>11</sup>My reference to the word COP refers to skills and abilities associated with civilian law enforcement.

## **Combat Support**

FMF MP organizations lose personnel to perform law enforcement for the base. This would not be bad if it did not significantly effect the capability of FMF MP to train in support of the warfighter. It is impossible for FMF MP to develop the skills and tactics associated with combat support because of insufficient manning levels. Currently, the Second Marine Division Military Police Company assign their MP to Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune as part of the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP).<sup>12</sup> (FAP assigns FMF Marines to fill support functions on the installation of station) Second Force Service Support Group Military Police Company sent approximately one of three platoons to base as part of the FAP program. Marine Wing Support Squadron 172 sends all their MP to Marine Corps Air Station, Futenma. All of First Force Service Support Group MP work as law enforcement on the base, with the exception of a squad deployed with the MEU. The First Marine Division MP also work for the base in a law enforcement capacity. So how do these units train to support the warfighter? They do not.

Military police company commanders are frustrated by their inability to keep their Marines within the unit to train. Lip service is paid if one says that MP support the MAGTF on each MEU. Minimal MP personnel deploy with each MEU, 5-8 military

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<sup>12</sup>Fleet Assistance Program tasks tenant commands with assigning a percentage of personnel to each base to support the installation requirements.

policemen, in insufficient numbers to perform critical support functions for the commander. Many times, they are tasked with security of static operation centers, which is not their mission, per doctrine. To support the commander, MP must deploy with a robust element to perform essential and doctrinal tasks for that commander. To be relevant, FMF MP must be proficient in their core competencies and provide qualitative support to the commander.

## **POLICE OR MILITARY POLICE**

### **The Arguments**

Commanders in the FMF realize that the MP units lack sufficient numbers of trained personnel who are ready to perform their support role in the MAGTF. This has lead to the use of combat troops to perform duties better suited for the MP. The disagreement among the Marine Corps' leadership on the necessity to have MP units within the FMF is a debate that has gone on for years. Why resource MP when they can not perform their combat missions? When a mission suited for employment of MP is identified, a combat unit receives the assignment because the MP are not prepared to deploy as a unit.

EXERCISE FAIRWINDS is a prime example. Marine Forces Atlantic assigned Company D, 2d Tank Battalion as the deployed for training force, to perform security duty for United States Support Group Haiti. The company provided convoy security,



remote site security, base security, and maintained a quick reaction force for the Group Commander. These missions are the core competencies of the MP. As the Provost Marshal in Haiti, the tankers performed their mission well, but, at the expense of armor readiness. The assignment was an MP unit mission and the Marine Corps lost an opportunity for MP to train in every doctrinal mission. The danger, then, is the perception that combat troops train to perform the MP mission and therefore MP are not required, but at what cost.

Company D, Second Tanks train to violently attack and kill the enemy with lethal firepower. They are the gunfighters and that psychological factor is essential to the front line warrior. Captain Flatter, an analyst at Manpower and Reserve Affairs wrote,

"Military police Marines are ingrained with an escalation force' mentality from the first day of their military occupational specialty (MOS) training. Once again, infantryman can be taught the concept, but doing so consciously backs them away from the "gunfighter" mentality that is required in 99 percent of their missions. Military police are also trained and capable of conducting full-throttle offensive combat, but 99 percent of their missions are not as gunfighters.<sup>13</sup>

Teaching combat forces to use an escalation of force, nonlethal weapons, and detention techniques, which MP train to do, may have an impact on that gunfighter's edge. Conversely, that gunfighter's edge may create problems.

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<sup>13</sup>Capt J. R. Flatter, (USMC), "Military Police: A Force of Choice for the 21st Century MEU (SOC)," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1997, 36.

There were several security related incidents handled by the tankers to resolve incidents against unarmed antagonists that would have been handled much differently by MP because of their use of force training, training is the answer. The young Marine standing security watch for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has the potential to create an international incident or turn a crowd into a mob by being overzealous in performing his duties. It is more likely that a gunslinger who has trained in these peacekeeping duties for 2 months will encounter more problems than a military policeman who receives restraint training throughout his career.

The Second Marine Division lost an armor company of warriors for a six month deployment. Adding the two months work up, developing base line MP skills, 6 months deployment, and one month for redeployment, that company lost nine months of armor training that diminished their currency to perform their primary duty. Lieutenant Polidoro, the Executive Officer for Second Tank company, summed it up when he wrote, "Marine tankers did not expect to find themselves deployed to a Third World country as a provisional rifle company...without its tanks."<sup>14</sup>

Anyone can train to be a military policeman and you can train anyone to be an infantryman; but, how effective can you train someone to be both an infantryman and a military policeman? Infantrymen already train for a considerable range of missions;

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<sup>14</sup>1stLT John Polidoro, Jr. (USMC), "Marine Corps Tankers in Haiti." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1997, 46.

expecting them to perform the mission of military policemen will further burden the Marine and division trainers.

Although the tankers did well in Haiti, the MP lost a superior training opportunity directly related to their war-time mission. MP are needed to perform a specialized role in the Marine Corps and require training opportunities. Maintain good order and discipline within the force and provide excellent capabilities for OOTW is the MP support role to the commander. The Military Police Field must fix the problem.

## **Fixes**

There are two steps required to make MP relevant in the 21st century. The first is transformation. The Commandant wrote,

*"The 21st Century battlefield will require our Marine to be trained to the highest standard... To prevail on this battlefield, our Marines must have individual warrior skills second to none, they must have absolute faith in the integrity of their unit - their team - "*<sup>15</sup>

The second requirement is structure. The Commandant's guidance states, "The challenges associated with warfighting in the 21st Century mandate that the Marine Corps reassess, and if necessary redesign, our structure and organization."<sup>16</sup>

Transformation of the military police rest solely on putting the Marines back into the unit to train for their war-time mission. If the adage of 'train as you fight and fight as you train' is true, it is imperative that the military policeman

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<sup>15</sup>Commandant, United States Marine Corps, *Commandant's Planning Guidance Frag order*, USMC, 31 Aug 1997.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

train to standard. The subject matter expert's conference held in August of 1996 addressed this issue also. They stated that training is not being accomplished because personnel are not available and that the commanders are also aware that they are only marginally trained for their doctrinal missions.<sup>17</sup>

Training as a unit provides cohesion, synergy, and confidence which directly relates to mission accomplishment. MP bring vital skills to assist the gunfighter; but, if not trained to meet those requirements, they then become a burden to the commander. The mission essential task list and training standards are available; company commanders want to conduct effective training; and the Marines want to do their jobs. The other side of the training coin is deploying MP with the MAGTF in exercises to develop the confidence of the supported units and enhance the MP combat support skills. This means supporting the MAGTF with sufficient MP to conduct and perform the missions necessary to support the commander. To provide the opportunity for training of the MP, the structure of the field must change if the focus is to be on combat support to the MAGTF. It also must change from within, MP must take an active role in supporting change to the field.

An MP Battalion in the MEF would be the ideal force structure. This would provide the battalion commander the ability to provide combat support in the single battle concept. As the MEF commander's special staff officer on MP operations and

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<sup>17</sup>Military Police Subject Matter Expert Conference Notes. Washington DC: Law Enforcement Branch, August 1996.

the MP battalion commander, he could coordinate all aspects of MP operations to ensure that they are synchronized with the MEF commander's intent and concept of operations. The MP battalion structure would allow flexibility and synergy of effort to meet the challenges on the future battlefield and to direct MP capabilities to where they are most needed in a timely manner. The centralized control of this structure will focus all MP assets to specific doctrinal missions throughout each phase of the battle. As a battalion, the S-3 would become the planning cell to coordinate MP efforts throughout the battle space to ensure maximum use of minimum resources.

A battalion would coordinate standardized training and operating procedures, focus logistic support for MP operations, and provide a single source reference for MP support to the warfighter. The most important aspect of a MP battalion structure is that it would husband resources and provide synergy to ensure that MP operations focus on the intent and concept of operation in the single battle


A battalion structure is the best for providing MP support to the MEF commander; but, will require an increase in structure to meet the administration and logistic support required by a battalion unit. With a mandate that there will be no force

structure increases, the logical step would be to develop MP companies within each MEF.

The subject matter expert's conference addressed the force structure issue and proposed a structure change that would combine a representative number of MAW MP, the FSSG MP, and MARDIV MP companies into a military police and force protection company within the Headquarters Battalion of each MEF. The structure includes assigning correction specialists to the MP company to perform EPW operations and confinement of United States prisoners. The tables below depict proposed manpower recommendations and structure by the subject matter experts for MEF MP companies. The first table shows the MP assets currently in the subordinate commands and the total represents the proposed manpower for each of the MEFs.

	FSSG	DIV	WING	BRIG	TOTAL
I MEF	101	44	42	13	200
II MEF	110	44	33	13	200
III MEF	60	44	36	10	150

### SME Proposed Military Police Organizational Chart



The subject matter experts also proposed a general concept of employment for the MP Company. The Company would operate with a headquarters platoon, a General Support platoon and five operational platoons. Three of the operational platoons would be dedicated to MEU (SOC) operations with one in training and work-up preparations to support the MEU commander, one actually attached to the MEU afloat and one in post MEU (SOC) deployment operations. The fourth platoon would be operationally committed to the Base or Station Provost Marshal to perform law enforcement duties and conduct required Marine training. This platoon would also be available for deployment in a rapid response role. The General Support platoon would be tasked with supporting Combined Arms Exercises, Special Purpose MAGTF deployments, as a rapid response force to support a commander requiring immediate MP

support, to support the installation Provost Marshal during special events requiring an increased MP presence.<sup>18</sup>

This could be a great step in the right direction. It is basically the same proposal offered at the Provost Marshal's Conference in 1991, except that the 1991 proposal called for a battalion, and similar to the proposal that Lieutenant Colonel Winterstein, Head, Law Enforcement Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, offered to the Marine Corps in 1991 and 1992 without success. This proposal gets the MP Marines back into the units to train and available to support base and station law enforcement.

First of all, there must be a focus of effort for MP support for the MAGTF. MP efforts should compliment all supported commanders. The MEF Provost Marshal can provide that integration of effort. Currently, he is treated as an extra officer to fill a vacant slot and performs his duties as the Provost Marshal when needed. This is not the way to be successful. If not a separate entity, the Provost Marshal should be assigned to the G-3 for Military Police Operations and have a MP planning cell comprised of one company grade officer and four enlisted MP Marines.

The planing cell should be responsible for preparing the MP annex of the plan and ensuring support to the MAGTF across all doctrinal missions. The planning cell could also provide

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<sup>18</sup>Military Police Subject Matter Expert Conference Notes. Washington DC: Law Enforcement Branch, August 1996.



manpower to assist in future planning and current operation execution. This concept would integrate MP support for the division, group and the air wing within the area of operations and provide resource flexibility to meet the requirements of current operation. It permits surge operations and the focus of specific capabilities to specific short duration missions such and main supply route security during decisive operations.

Assigning a planning cell to the MEF Provost Marshal has an additional advantage. It provides the MEF commanding general with an officer capable of integrating force protection requirements and MP support to the battle. The capabilities of MP units integrated into the single battle would have a synergistic effect on the support provided to the warriors.

By developing a planning cell to coordinate MP functions, the MEF commander can reap the benefits through enhanced force protection. To underscore the focus on force protection, the Provost Marshal and his planning cell would not be able to do it alone. The best way to enhance force protection is to assemble a Force Protection Team comprised of the G-3, G-2, and the Provost Marshal. Operations, intelligence and physical security expertise focused on force protection activities would provide the commander with recommendations and courses of action on all force protection issues. This team approach to force protection enhances the supportability in conjunction with battlespace functions for the MEF operations

Under the subject matter expert's proposal for the MEF, the military police company commander would have the assets to support the division, the air wing, and the group's area of operations. With the MP consolidated, the company commander has the flexibility to assign platoons to specific missions in support of each phase or stage of the operation. He could also react to threats in the rear area more decisively.

The subject matter expert's proposal did not discuss the structure of the air wing MP assets, except that they are going to decrease their numbers by 30 to 35 personnel. The restructuring of the air wing is as important as the restructuring of the division and group MP assets. A company of MP assigned to the Headquarters and Service Squadron could consolidate the departments under one MAW Provost Marshal. The company commander would be a special staff officer for the air combat element commander on all matters relating to MP and subordinate to the MEF Provost Marshal.

Training for airfield and rear area security mission can be accomplish in coordination with the station Provost Marshal and his responsibility for station flight line security. Coordination between the MEF military police company commander and the wing military police company commander, through the MEF Provost Marshal, on allocation of personnel for MAGTF deployments will ensure allocation of resources to meet the MP requirements for the deployment without duplication of effort. The MEF

Provost Marshal's responsibility will be to ensure that adequate personnel and equipment are provided to meet all contingencies which may occur on the deployment and to monitor the effectiveness of MP support to the MAGTF.

MP personnel to support training, deployments, and exercise requirements are essential to supporting the warfighter efficiently with highly trained and skilled MP. This manpower must be efficiently coordinated with the base and station Provost Marshals. A critical look at the missions and functions performed by MP in law enforcement duties must be made, then tough decisions are necessary to meet the structure within base law enforcement and FMF MP units to support the warfighter.

The following recommendations are based on CONUS installations. Gate guards are a nice to have commodity, but they are not essential. They provide little security for the installation since most vehicles can enter the base during rush hour without being stopped. Many bases have state roads which run through them permitting civilians access to the installation. During heightened threat conditions the majority of installations provide augmentation to the Provost Marshal that will support manning and securing vehicle gates. MP can be provided by the MEF Provost Marshal to augment base law enforcement for these situations. This will save manpower and increase vehicle patrols for security of installations. Many installations employ MP to guard critical assets such as ammunition storage facilities.

This is not a MP function. A constituted base guard force meets this requirement; however, ammunition and armory storage sites are protected by alarms that are tied into the Provost Marshal office. The alarms and construction of storage sites negate the requirement for armed guards.

Manpower can also be reduced through automation of administrative requirements within the department. This standardization should be a Headquarters Marine Corps responsibility. It is now left up to individual Provost Marshals at each installation and results in having different systems operating at each department. MP should provide the technical advice for parking at unit functions. It should be the unit's responsibility to provide attendants to organize and direct parking at their functions. MP should only be involved in large base function where they would get support from the FMF MP.

Lastly, employing civilian workers in vehicle registration will significantly increase MP manpower and make them available for combat support missions. Civilian workers add continuity to the department and a stable work force.

Contracting for law enforcement on military installations is also an available option, but not feasible. Marines take care of their own. Marine MP patrolling military bases provides a sense of security which may not be present with contracted security. Marines conducting law enforcement duties are training for one of their combat missions in support of the warfighter.

## **LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS**

The burden lies on the leadership within the MP Field to support changes so that Marine Corps MP will be relevant in support of the single battle. The field must contribute to supporting the warfighter and, in the words of the Commandant, "fighting and winning our nation's battles." Performing battlefield missions should be the focus of every MP officer and training department, whether it is an FMF unit or a base law enforcement unit.

The MP leadership must sell the capabilities of MP to the FMF commanders and be able to back the sale up with well-trained motivated Marines that significantly enhance a commander's ability to prosecute any mission assigned. Publishing articles on employment of MP in low intensity conflicts, humanitarian operations, civic assistance efforts, peacekeeping operations, and as combat support in operational maneuver from the sea for high intensity conflicts will bring the capabilities of MP to the forefront. Leadership in the field must focus MP relevance on combat support and force protection. By focusing on MP core competencies, four battlefield missions, and becoming the force protection specialist the MP field will have a full plate.

Marine Corps leaders have neglected the capabilities of MP and what they bring to the battle. FMF leaders must integrate the MP capabilities into all training and exercise scenarios. A commander must use all available tools and resources to succeed

in the future battle environment. Recommended changes to the MP field must be implemented by senior leadership. It is time to act. Base and installation leadership must incorporate changes into how MP conduct of law enforcement. The days of having skilled MP stand at entrance gates have long passed. It is time to husband MP resources and accept minimal risk in specified areas for maximum gain of capabilities in others.

### **SUMMARY**

#### **Police or Military Police?**

The MP field is relatively new and has been around for only twenty seven years. The gravitation of focus to law enforcement and away from combat support was natural. In the 1970s, senior leadership saw drugs, racial problems, and crime within the Corps as serious problems and law enforcement became the focus of effort.

Looking for ways to increase manpower, the installation Provost Marshals turned to the MP in the FMF as a source of additional personnel. Vietnam was over and the Marine Corps was not fighting or deployed to any major engagement, nor did it have many full division exercises. Slowly the FMF lost MP personnel to installations and stations to perform law enforcement duties.

The heavy emphasis on law enforcement depleted the ability of FMF MP to perform essential missions on the battlefield. A change in focus and force structure is required. Combat support

is what being a military policeman is all about. Law enforcement is just a small part of the MP role and mission. The Marine Corps requires Marine MP capable of supporting all battlespace functions in support of the MAGTF. Gordon Williamson and Ron Volstad, writers who researched the Germany military police and how they were employed during World War II, wrote;

"The military policeman must be one of the least appreciated (certainly by his fellow soldiers) yet most indispensable military figures in modern history. In the mobile warfare of the 20th century no army could keep its vital supply convoys on the move and its supply routes open without the military policeman."<sup>19</sup>

Appreciation for MP capabilities is lacking. Combat leaders have no idea what the field can offer them to enhance their warfighting capabilities. When MP are brought up in a discussion by combat arms personnel, it usually revolves around MP staking out base clubs to arrest Marines for drunk driving. To change this impression the MP must first become part of all training exercises and deployments. Respect from warriors is earned by the efficient employment of MP performing their battlefield mission in support of the gunslinger. Sometimes change is good.

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<sup>19</sup>Williamson, Gordon and Ron Volstad. *German Military Police Units 1939-45*. London, Great Britain: Osprey 1989, 3.

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